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the interest which

took in the statue, had

I

photographed with the permission of

it

Museum, and we owe it to his courtesy that we are able to
readers of The Of en Court. We hereby publicly express our thanks

the authorities of the
offer

it

both

to

to the

him and

We

to the authorities of the

have before us

Royal Museum of Leyden.

in this statue the ideal of

Wisdom

sitting in the attitude

which she gives by the assistance
enumerating the points which she makes. The halo behind

of a teacher, evidently enforcing the instruction
of her fingers, used in

her head indicates that the spirit of

Buddha

of the Tathagata,

her features indicate the influence of the Gan-

a lotos flower

is

dhara school, founded by Greek

;

is

artists in the

in the valley of the Indus, flourishing in the

incarnate in her

;

her seat, like that

Graeco-Indian kingdom of Gandhara

second and

first

centuries before Christ.

Javanese art is distinguished by a purity of taste that indicates a purity of
religious sentiment and conception in the artists.
What a pity that the civilisation
of

which the work

of art before us

is

a

symptom was swept from

earth to be succeeded only by periods of barbarism

the face of the
P. C.

!

BERKELEY'S TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
Berkeley's Treatise Co72Ccrni72g the Principles of Human K^ioivledge, of
just been published as the fourth of the series of Philosophical

which a reprint has

Classics of the Religion of Science Library,^

first

appeared

in

Dublin

in 1710.

The

second edition, the last of the author's life-time, appeared in London in 1734, in
the same volume with the third edition of the Tiirce Dialogues Betzueen Hylas
and Philonous, a reprint of which will also immediately appear in the Religion of
Science Library.

The

Principles, published

systematic of

all of

when

the author

was only

twenty-six,

is

Berkeley's expositions of his theory of knowledge

direct outgrowth of the

Essay Tozoards a Nezu Theory of Vision

:

the most
it

was the
which

(1709),

sought to banish the metaphysical abstractions of Absolute Space and Extension
from philosophy, and was itself mainly concerned with the abolition of Abstract

Matter and of the ontological and theological corollaries of that concept. The Dialogues treat of substantially the same subjects, but are more familiar and elegant
in form and are devoted in the main to the refutation of the most plausible popular

and philosophical objections

doctrine.
They have been called the gem
and on them Berkeley's claim to be the great

new

to the

of British metaphysical literature,

modern master of Socratic dialogue rests. No other writer in English, save perhaps Hume, has approached Berkeley in lucidity of metaphysical style.
The two books, which mark a distinctively new epoch in philosophy and science,
together afford a comprehensive survey of Berkeley's doctrines, placing within the
reach of every reader in remarkably brief compass opinions which have profoundly
Works of this kind have been almost
influenced the course of intellectual history.
invariably distinguished by their brevity.

"I had no

inclination,"

is

Berkeley's

What
with the view of giving hints to thinking men, who have
go to the bottom of things, and pursue them in their own

have

characteristic remark, "to trouble the world with large volumes.

I

done was rather
and curiosity to

leisure

Two

sion of thinking, would,
1

minds.

making what is read the occarender the whole familiar and easy to the mind,

or three times reading these small tracts, and
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shocking appearance which hath often been observed

to

attend

speculative truths."

much popular, and even proendeavored in his prefatory remarks to
the Pri)iciples, to give by appropriate quotations and digests a synthesis of current
philosophical opinion concerning his doctrines, to point out his relation to his predecessors, to indicate certain peculiarities of terminology and thought necessary to
the understanding of his theory, and to show finally wherein certain of his analyses
Berkeley's philosophy, having been the victim of

fessional, misapprehension, the editor has

GEORGE BERKELEY
(1685-1753)

From

a picture by Sinibert,

now

in

Yale College

have been rendered antiquated by modern scientific inquiry. Berkeley's life is so
we cannot refrain from offering to our readers the sketch given of
it in l^eyNes's Bioi'-7-apJu'cal History of Philosophy [iSi\^), a work which, though
on technical points partisan and not always trustworthy, has at least the merit of a

interesting that

vivacious style.

LIFE OF BERKELEY.

"There

are few

men

George Berkeley, Bishop

of

whom England

has better reason

to

be proud than of

of Cloyne; for to extraordinary merits as a thinker

and

—
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writer he united the most exquisite purity and generosity of character

and it is
moot point whether he was greater in head or heart.
"He was born on the 12th of March, 1685, at Kilcrin, in the county of Kilkenny, Ireland.
He was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, and was in 1707 admitted as a fellow. In 1709 he published his Essay Tozuards a N^eiv Theory
of Visio7i, which made an epoch in science } and the year after, his Prhicifles
of Huniati Kiiozuledge, which made an epoch in metaphysics. After this he came
to London, where he was received with open arms.
Ancient learning, exact science, polished society, modern literature, and the fine arts, contributed to adorn
and enrich the mind of this accomplished man. All his contemporaries agreed
;

a

still

with the Satirist in ascribing

To Berkeley every

virtue under heaven.

Adverse factions and hostile wits concurred only in loving, admiring, and contributing to advance him.
The severe sense of Swift endured his visions the modest
Addison endeavored to reconcile Clarke to his ambitious speculations. His char;

Pope into fervid praise. Even the discerning, fastidand turbulent Atterbury said, after an interview with him, "so much learning, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had
been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman," '^
" His acquaintance with the wits led to his contributing to the Guardian. He
became chaplain and afterwards secretary to the Earl of Peterborough, whom he
accompanied on his embassy to Sicily. He subsequently made the tour of Europe
with Mr. Ashe and at Paris met Malebranche, with whom he had an animated
discussion on the ideal theory.
In 1724 he was made dean of Derry.
This was
worth eleven hundred pounds a year to him but he resigned it in order to dedicate his life to the conversion of the North American savages, stipulating only with
the Government for a salary of one hundred pounds a year. On this romantic and
generous expedition he was accompanied by his young wife. He set sail for Rhode
Island, carrying with him a valuable library of books and the bulk of his property.
But, to the shame of the Government, be it said, the promises made him were not
fulfilled, and after seven years of single-handed endeavour he was forced to return
acter converted the satire of
ious,

;

;

England, having spent the greater part of his fortune in vain.
" He was made Bishop of Cloyne in 1734.
When he wished to resign, the
King would not permit him and being keenly alive to the evils of non-residence,
he made an arrangement before leaving Cloyne whereby he settled 200/. a year
during his absence on the poor. In 1752 he removed to Oxford, where, on the

to

;

evening of the 14th January, in 1753, he was suddenly seized, while reading, with
palsy of the heart, and died almost instantaneously.

numerous writings we cannot here speak two only belong to our suband the Dialogues of Hylas and Philo7ions.
[His other most important philosophical work was Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1733)]. We hope to remove some of the errors and prejudices with
'

'

ject

:

1

Of

his

;

the Principles of Knozuledge,

This statement

is

hardly exact.

The Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision was a psychoThe work has been vsell characterised by Prof. A. C.

logical rather than a scientific treatise.

Fraser in his edition of the collected works of Berkeley, Vol. I., page 5, as follows: "The treatise is a professed account of the facts, the whole facts, and nothin;^ but the facts of which we
are visually conscious, as distinguished from pretended facts and metaphysical abstractions,
which confused thought, an irregular exercise of imagination, or an abuse of words had substituted for them. It is a contribution to the psychological analysis of the fact of vision, and not
T. J. McC.
a deduction from merely physical experiments in optics or the physiology of the eye."
2

Sir

James Mackintosh.

—
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name
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encrusted.

We

was a

wildest moods, Berkeley

hope

to

show
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even

that,

in

plain, sincere, deep-thinking

playing with paradoxes to display his

what are called his
man, not a sophist

skill.

THE TRADITIONAL MISCONCEPTION OF BERKELEY'S IDEALISM.
"All the world has heard of Berkeley's Idealism, and innumerable 'coxcombs'
have vanquished it "with a grin.'' Ridicule has not been sparing of it. Argument
has not been wanting. It has been laughed at, written at, talked at, shrieked at.
That it has been understood is not so apparent. Few writers seem to have honand those few are certainly not among his
estly read and appreciated his works
;

In reading the criticisms upon his theory

antagonists.-

it

is

quite ludicrous to

notice the constant iteration of trivial objections which, trivial as they are, Berkeley

had often anticipated. In fact, the critics misunderstood him, and then reproached
him for his inconsistency inconsistency, not with his principles, but with theirs.
They force a meaning upon his words which he had expressly rejected and then
triumph over him because he did not pursue their principles to the extravagances
which would have resulted from them.

—

;

"When Berkeley denied the existence of matter, he simply denied the existence of that unknown substratu??!, the existence of which Locke had declared to
be a necessary inferetice from our knowledge of qualities, but the nature of which
must ever be altogether hidden from us. Philosophers had assumed the existence
i. e., of a noiimenon lying underneath
zW. phenojneiia
a substratum
supporting all qualities a something in which all accidents inhere. This unknown
substance Berkeley denies. It is a mere abstraction, he says. If it is unknown,
unknowable, it is a figment, and I will none of it for it is a figment worse than
useless it is pernicious, as the basis of all Atheism. If by matter you understand
that which is seen, felt, tasted, and touched, then I say matter exists I am as
firm a believer in its existence as any one can be, and herein I agree zvith the
vulgar. If, on the contrary, you understand by matter that occult substratum
which is not seen, not felt, not tasted, and 7iot touched that of which the senses
do not, cannot, inform you then I say I believe not in the existence of matter,
and herein I differ zuith the philoso_phers and agree zvith the vulgar.
" I am not changing things into ideas,' he says, but rather ideas into things
since those immediate objects of perception, which according to you (Berkeley
might have said, according to philosophers) are only appcara7iccs of things, I take
to be the real things themselves.
" 'Hylas: Things!
you may pretend what you please; but it is certain you
leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside of zuhich only strikes

—

of substance,

—

;

;

:

—

—

'

'

;

the senses.
" 'Philonous:

What j'ow

m.e the very things themselves.

ceive only sensible forms

appearances

;

I,

" Berkeley
1

;

.

.

.

empty forms and outside

We

but herein

real beings.
is

call the

both therefore agree in

we

differ

:

you

will

of things
this,

have them

that
to

seem

we

to

per-

be empty

In short, you do not trust your senses; I do.'

always accused of having propounded a theory which contra-

"And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with
These words were written

a grin."

Pope.

Since then Prof. A. Campbell Eraser's magnificent
edition of Berkeley's collected works (4 vols. Clarendon Press. 1871) and his exhaustive dissertations on Berkeley's doctrines, together with the many excellent histories of philosophy of the last
half century, have rendered such misunderstanding, at least on the part of the philosophical
public, almost impossible.
T. J. HTcC,
2

—

in 1845-1846.
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That a man who should thus disregard the senses
was a ready answer ridicule was not slow in retort declamaelbow-room, and exhibited itself in a triumphant attitude. It was

diets the evidence of the senses.

must be out of

his,

tion gave itself

:

;

easy to declare (Reid, Inquiry) that

the

'

man who

seriously entertains this belief,

though in other respects he may be a very good man, as a
lieves he is made of glass
yet surely he hath a soft place
and hath been hurt by much thinking.'

man may be who

" Unfortunately for the
the senses
belief of

;

be-

understanding,

in his

;

Berkeley did 7Wt contradict the evidence of

critics,

did not propound a theory at variance in this point with the ordinary

mankind.

His peculiarity

evidence of the senses.

would he accept.

He

What

is,

that he confined himself exclusively to the

the senses informed

him

of, that,

resolutely in the centre of the instinctive belief of

mankind

and that only,

he placed himself
there he took up his

held fast to the facts of consciousness
:

;

stand, leaving to philosophers the region of supposition, inference,

substances.
" The reproach

made

to

him

really the reproach he

is

made

and of occult

to philosophers,

they would not trust to the evidence of their senses; that over and above

viz., that

what the senses told them, they imagined an occult something of which the senses
gave no indication.
'Now it was against this metaphysical phantom of the brain,'
says an acute critic (Blackiaood's Magazine, June, 1842, p. 814) 'this crochet-

work

and against

were
man, and that
he must rest satisfied with mere appearances was regarded, and rightly, by him as
the parent of scepticism with all her desolating train.
He saw that philosophy,
in giving up the reality immediately within her grasp, in favor of a reality supposed to be less delusive, which lay beyond the limits of experience, resembled the
dog in the fable, who, carrying a piece of meat across a river, let the substance slip
from his jaws, while with foolish greed he snatched at the shadow in the stream.
The dog lost his dinner, and philosophy let go her secure hold upon truth. He
therefore sided with the vulgar, who recognise no distinction between the reality
and the appearance of objects, and repudiating the baseless hypothesis of a world
existing unknown and unperceived, he resolutely maintained that what are called
the sensible shows of things are in truth the very things themselves.
"True it is that owing to the ambiguities of language Berkeley's theory does
not seem to run counter to the ordinary belief of mankind, because by Matter men
of philosophers,

directed.

The

it

alone, that all the attacks of Berkeley

doctrine that the realities of things were not

made

for

when

commonly understand

the seen, the tasted, the touched,

existence of Matter

denied, people naturally suppose that the existence of the

seen, the tasted,

osophical sense,

is

and the touched
is ?iot

is

&c

;

therefore

denied, never suspecting that Matter, in

seen, 7iot tasted, 7iot touched.

Berkeley has not,

its

the

phil-

must be
one of the
it

Thus he says in
all ambiguity.
opening sections of his Pri?ici^les of Human Kiiozuledge, that "It is indeed an
opinion strangely prevailing amongst men that houses, mountains, rivers, and,

confessed, sufficiently guarded against

in a

word,

all

sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their

being perceived by the understanding.'

This

is

striking the key note false.

rouses the reader to oppose a coming paradox.
" Yet Berkeley foresaw and answered the objections which

He was

Wimpey,

It

Beattie,

he
was not spinning an ingenious theory, knowing all the while that it was no more
than an ingenuity. He was an earnest thinker, patient in the search after truth.
Anxious, therefore, that his speculations should not be regarded as mere dialectical
Reid, and others brought forward.

not giving utterance to a caprice

;

MISCELLANEOUS.
displays, he

endeavoured on various occasions

to
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guard himself from misapprehen-

sion.

"

do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend
That the things I see with my eyes and touch
with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing
whose existence I deny is that which philosophers call Matter, or corporeal sub'

I

either by sensation or reflection.

And in doing this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I
dare say, will never miss it.
" If any man thinks we detract from the reality of existence of things, he is
very far from understanding what has been premised in the plainest terms I could
stance.

.

.

.

'

be urged that thus

think

of.

.

away

all

corporeal substances.

be taken

.

It will

.

in the

To

much

this

at least

my answer

is,

is

true, viz., that

that

if

the

word

we

take

siihstaiicc

vulgar sense for a combination of sensible qualities, such as exten-

sion, solidity, weight, &c., this

we cannot be accused

of taking away.'

But

if it

be

taken in the philosophic sense, for the support of accidents or qualities without the

acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take
had any existence, not even in the imagination.*
" But say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still
believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, however plausible, to prevail
over the certainty of them. Be it so assert the evidence of sense as high as you
please, zve are zuilUng to do the same.
That what I see, hear, and feel, doth exist, i. e., is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being
but I do
not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof of anything which is
not perceived by sense. '"After reading these passages (and more of a similar cast might be quoted) in
what terms shall we speak of the trash written to refute Idealism ? Where was the
acuteness of the Reids and Beatties, when they tauntingly asked why Berkeley did
not run his head against a post, did not walk over precipices, &c., as, in accordance with his theory, no pain, no broken limbs, could result?^ Where was philosophical acumen, when a tribe of writers could imagine they refuted Berkeley by
an appeal to common sense when they contrasted the instinctive beliefs of man-

mind
away

then, indeed,

;

I

that which never
'

;

;

—

who

kind with the speculative paradoxes of a philosopher,
with

common

"Men

expressly took his stand

sense against philosophers?

may

trained in metaphysical speculations

non-existence of an invisible, unknowable substratum

find
;

it

difficult to

conceive the

but that the bulk of man-

almost impossible to conceive any such substratum

is a fact which the
have experienced this more than once. We remember a discussion which lasted an entire evening, in which by no power of illustration, by no force of argument, could the idea of this substance, apart from its
sensible qualities, be rendered conceivable.
"Berkeley, therefore, in denying the existence of matter, sided with common

kind find

it

slightest inquiry will verify.

sense.

He

We

thought with the vulgar, that matter was that of which his senses

1 An answer to Dr. Johnson' s peremptory refutation of Berkeley,
Berkeley ever denied that what we call stones existed

viz.,

kicking a stone

:

in-

as

if

!

'i

Principles of Human Knmuledge, Sections 35,

36, 37, 40.

3" But what is the consequence? I resolve not to believe my senses. I break my head against
a post that comes in my way I step into a dirty kennel and after twenty such wise and rational
actions I am taken up and clapt into a madhouse. Now I confess I had rather make one of
those credulous fools whom nature imposes upon, than of those wise and rational philosophers
who resolve to withhold assent at all this expense." Reid's Inqtdry, ch. vi., sec. 20. This one
passage is as good as a hundred.
;

;

—
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formed him; not an occult something of which he could have no information. The
table he saw before him certainly existed
it was hard, polished, coloured, of a
certain figure, and cost some guineas.
But there was no fihantom table lying
underneath the apparent table there was no invisible substance supporting that
What he perceived was a table, and nothing more what he perceived it to
table.
His starting-point was thus what
be, he would believe it to be, and nothing more.
the plain dictates of his senses, and the senses of all men furnished."
:

—

;

MONCURE

D.

CONWAY, A MILITANT MISSIONARY OF
LIBERALISM.

Some

time ago

we published an

article

on the Boxer Movement, illustrated by

the reproduction of Chinese proclamations and pictures, from the pen of a Christian missionary, the Rev. George T. Candlin, who lived in China during the outbreak of the troubles, and who is known to our readers through several thoughtful
contributions on Chinese literature to both The Open Court and The Monist. His
pamphlet, Chinese Fiction, published in our Religion of Science Library, shows

and appreciation

his thorough acquaintance with

modes

and

of the Chinese character

of thought.

number we offer an article on the same subject, from the oppoMoncure D. Conway, whose trenchant pen has won him a deserved reputation for the humorous and satirical treatment of such phases of the
In the present

site

standpoint, by

and social conditions of our age as seem to need reform.
Moncure D. Conway is a descendent of the Washington family, a Virginian
by birth and a minister by education. In 1857, he was compelled to leave Washington, D. C, where he had charge of a congregation, on account of his denunciareligious

He then accepted a call to a Unitarian church in Cincinnati, and
war broke out lectured gratuitously throughout the Northern states, adHe set a good example to his fellow-citizens by colonising
vocating emancipation.
In 1863, he visited England, and in 1870-71 served as
his father's slaves in Ohio.
a war correspondent for the Neiu York Wo7-ld, during the Franco-German War.
Having grown more and more liberal, he became the speaker of the South Place
Ethical Society in London, and since resigning his position lives as a literary man,
devoting himself mainly to religious and ethical topics.
Moncure D. Conway is not yet entirely free from a certain acerbity in the
statement of his propositions, which may be due to the unpleasant experiences and
persecutions to which he has been repeatedly subjected on account of his convictions of slavery.

when

the

tions.

Our readers

will

observe that he denounces militant Christianity on account

of the excrescences of its militant character, but

has proved his whole

life

it

will

be noticed that he himself

long one of the most fervid militant missionaries for what

he recognised as the truth.

THE JUDGES OF

p. c.

JESUS, JEWS OR GENTILES?

To the Editor of the Open Court

:

Allow me to ask if you will elucidate a statement published in your April number in your commentary on the story "The Crown of Thorns."
The passage alluded to is as follows: " Jesus was crucified by the Romans,
not by the Jews." Meaning that the death-decree passed on the Teacher of Galilee
by the Sanhedrin of Jerusalem was executed according to the Roman law by

—

Roman

officials

?

—

